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Summary
A Network Externality within Goods
Over the last decade, mobile phones have spread rapidly in many developed
countries. In the market for traditional mobile phones, there is just one
network externality (network eect), as has been recognized since the semi-
nal work of Katz and Shapiro (1985).1In addition to these standard mobile
phones, smartphones, for example, the iPhone from Apple, have recently in-
creased their share and importance in our daily lives.2 One notable property
of the smartphone market that diers from the market for standard mobile
phones is that it contains the following two externalities.
First, there is a network externality within carriers that has been consid-
ered in the existing literature, such as Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Chen
and Chen (2011). According to this externality, a consumer who purchases a
product or service from a certain carrier gains a network benet when other
consumers purchase the same or dierent product or service from the same
carrier.
Second, we should recognize the existence of another important network
1In Belleamme and Peitz (2011 ), network eects has been formally dened as follows:
\A product is said to exhibit network eects if each user's utility is increasing in the number
of other users of that product or products compatible with it."
2For detail of the spread of iPhone, see West and Mace(2010)
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externality within distinct types of smartphones supplied to dierent carriers
by the same producer of smartphone devices.3In the real world, for instance,
a customer of a carrier who has Apple's iPhone gains a network benet when
the number of iPhone users increases, even when these users are customers
of other carriers. This network benet takes the form of enhancement of
reputation about the iPhone, or an increase in complementary goods, such
as application software for the iPhone.4 Thus, even if consumers who use the
iPhone do not use the same carrier, all consumers gain a network benet from
the increase in the number of iPhone users. To the best of our knowledge,
this externality has received no attention in the previous studies that consider
network externality. In this thesis, I analyze a market in which only the latter
network externality works. Therefore, one of the contributions of this thesis is
providing some theoretical properties of a market in the presence of network
externality within goods.
A Vertical or Horizontal Dierentiation
Previously, I explained within-product network externality by using smart-
phone market. In such smarthone industry, the products are vertically dier-
entiated.5 Another example of vertical dierentiated product market is bicy-
3In Kitamura (2013), I dene the network benet from within-product network ex-
ternality as follows: \A consumer who purchases a product from a certain rm gains
a network benet when other consumers purchase the same product from the same or
dierent rm."
4In this thesis, I do not mention what kinds of network eect works; Direct and indirect
network eect. For these network eect, see Chou and Shy (1990), Nocke et al (2007),
Clements (2004), Church and Gandal (2012).
5An example of vertical dierentiation between iPhone and Android smartphones
in found in Geekbench (see http://browser.primatelabs.com/geekbench2/1030202 and
http://browser.primatelabs.com/android-benchmarks).
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cle component industry. In bicycle component industry, for instance, there
were one dominant rm, Shimano Inc., and four or ve smaller rms. In
1993, Shimano's sales were approximately $1.275 billion, and this accounted
for 75% of global sales of bicycle components, which was about $1.7 billion.
For mountain bicycle market, in particular, Shimano had become approxi-
mately 80% market share in 1990. Shimano produced all six components of
bicycle, Brake Lever, Shifter, Derailleur, Freewheel, Chain and Hub,6 and
each component was produced as several quality level, respectively. When
the number of users who buy a certain component increases, then a user of it
which is same quality level gains a network benet because of an increase in
the number of bicycle which can be equipped with it and/or an improvement
of some services and a nding how to maintain it by an increase in comment
on an Internet forum or web page.
In contrast this network externality works in some other industry in which
the products are horizontally dierentiated. For instance, home electronics,
PC industry and so on. In a television industry, when the number of users
who buy a certain television increases, then a user of it gains a network ben-
et because of an increase in complementary goods of it or an improvement
of some services. However, in this thesis, I characterize the equilibrium out-
come by looking at a monopolistic market.7 An example of monopoly in the
presence of network externality within goods is illustrated by Japan Tobacco
6Simano's market share of each component is seen in Fixson and Park(2008)
7Although only a monopolist is analyzed in this paper, in fact, I ascertained that
the outcome of duopoly model is almost the same to it of monopoly model. However, in
duopoly market, the interpretations of it's outcome are complicated because there are some
eects on equilibrium, competition of rms, network externalities and cannibalization.
Thus, I focus on only a monopoly market in the presence of network externalities with in
goods in this paper.
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Inc.(JT), manufactures of the tobacco and it is a monopolist in Japanese
tobacco industry. Similarly to above example, if the number of consumers
who subscribe a certain tobacco produced by JT in Japan increases, then a
user of it gains a benet by a network externality since the subscribers tend
to give valuable feedback and reviews or it is sold in many stores in Japan.
Constitution of this thesis
This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that all theoretically inves-
tigate issues related to the multi-product rm. In particular, chapter 3 and
4 consider a multi-product rm market in which there exist within-product
network externality.
In chapter 1 and 2,“ Cannibalization within the Single Vertically Dif-
ferentiated Duopoly"(co-authored with Tetsuya Shinkai) and“Product line
strategy within a vertically dierentiated duopoly”(co-authored with Tetsuya
Shinkai), we analyze multi-product duopoly market without any network ex-
ternalities in which the products are vertically dierentiated in order to clear
some properties of such market and to prepare the benchmark model in next
chapter.
In the third chapter,“Cost Reduction can Decrease Prot and Welfare in
a Monopoly”, I consider multi-product monopoly model with within-product
network externality in which the products are vertically dierentiated.
In the fourth chapter in this thesis,“ A Monopoly Model in which Two
Horizontally Dierentiated Goods with Network Externalities”, based on
Bental and Spiegel (1984) in which they consider a horizontally dierentiated
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multi-product oligopoly model without network externality, I analyze multi-
product monopoly model with within-product network externality in which
the products are horizontally dierentiated.
Contributions of this thesis
In this thesis, I focus on a multi-product rm market in which a rm supplies
two horizontally or vertically dierentiated products and on only the network
externality which works in product in order to simplify the model and shed
light on the eect of this network externality on the market. Then, the rst
contribution of this study is that I propose the new network externality which
works in product and nd some theoretical properties concluding cannibal-
ization. The model can be used as a benchmark of a market in the presence
of network externality within product. Second, I show that the monopolist
could earn more even when the production cost increases. In detail, when the
goods are not horizontally but vertically dierentiated, then the prot can
be convex function of the production cost. The reason is that I adopt, in this
study, the concept of equilibrium as Fullled Expectation Equilibrium and
consider the multi-product monopolist. Finally, in chapter 1 and 2, I pro-
pose a duopoly model in which rms with dierent costs supply two vertically
dierentiated products in the same market and also nd that change in the
quality superiority of goods and the relative cost eciency ratios characterize
graphically product line strategies of rms by the two ratios relationship.
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Chapter 1
Cannibalization within the
Single Vertically Dierentiated
Duopoly
10
abstract1
We consider cannibalization in a duopoly model in which rms with dif-
ferent costs supply two vertically dierentiated products in the same market.
We nd that an increase in the dierence in quality between the two goods
or a decrease in the marginal cost of the high-quality goods leads to canni-
balization. As a result, these goods keep low-quality goods from the market.
Then, as the dierence in quality between the two goods increases from a
suciently small to a suciently large level, we nd that 1) cannibalization
from the low-quality good to the high-quality good of the ecient rm ex-
pands, 2) cannibalization from the high-quality good to the low-quality good
of the inecient rm shrinks and establish that 3) an increase in the produc-
tion costs of the inecient rm improves social welfare when the dierence
in quality between the two goods is suciently small.
Keywords: Multi-product rm; Duopoly; Cannibalization; Vertical product
dierentiation
1The authors are grateful to Tommaso Valletti, Federico Etro, Hong Hwang, Noriaki
Matsushima, Toshihiro Matsumura, Kenji Fujiwara, and Keizo Mizuno for their useful
comments on an earlier version of this paper. The second author was supported by Grants-
in-Aid for Scientic Research (Nos. 23330099 and 24530255) MEXT. Furthermore, this
chapter is sum of the revised version of Kitamura and Shinkai (2013) and Kitamura and
Shinkai (2015)
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1.1 Introduction
In a real economy, there are oligopolistic markets in which rms produce
and sell multiple products that are vertically dierentiated within the same
market. For example, GM sells the Chevrolet Cruze and GMC Sierra PU,
and Toyota sells the Camry, Corolla Matrix, and Prius|Toyota's hybrid
car|in the same segment of the car market. Hyundai also sells the Elantra
and Hybrid Sonata in the same segment of the U.S. car market. As another
example, Apple sells the iPad Mini and the larger iPad in the tablet market.
Similarly, Samsung sells the Galaxy Note and the Galaxy Tab, in both a
smaller and a larger variety.2 Since consumers believe that the quality of
the rms' technology diers, each consumer places a dierent value on the
high-quality good of each rm. Thus, these markets are horizontally and
vertically dierentiated. Such markets present more cases of cannibalization.3
Cannibalization within the same market occurs when a rm increases the
output of one of its products by reducing the output of a similar competing
product in the same market.
The objective of this study is to examine cannibalization within the same
market from strategic point of view of the multi-product rm which supplies
two goods dierentiated in quality.
For the purpose of our analysis, both the quality level and the number
of dierentiated goods supplied by each rm are given. In addition, we
2See \Samsung's Brand Cannibalization," http://www.indianprice.com/mobiles/articles/15-
samsungs-brand-cannibalization.html.
3In fact, many reports suggest that the iPad Mini is cannibalizing sales of the larger
iPad. See, for example, Seward (2013), \Yes, the iPad Mini is cannibalizing sales of larger
iPad."
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do not consider new entries to the market in our model. In our setting,
both rms produce and supply two kinds of vertically dierentiated goods
in a market. 4 To understand the strategic aspects of cannibalization, we
consider two dierences: 1) the dierence in the quality of the goods; and
2) the dierence in the technology of the rms. Here, we characterize the
cannibalization resulting from these two dierences. Thus, we consider a
duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs of a high-quality good.
This study oers three contributions to existing literature. First, we
nd that cannibalization can be seen as a business strategy characterized
by a dierence in the quality of vertically dierentiated goods and in cost
eciency. Second, we show that, as the dierence in quality between the
two goods increases from a suciently small to a suciently large level,
cannibalization from the low-quality to the high-quality good of the ecient
rm expands, while that from the high-quality to the low-quality good of the
inecient rm shrinks. Third, we show that counter-intuitively, an increase
in the production costs of the inecient rm improves social welfare when
the dierence in the quality of the two goods is suciently small.
We illustrate the intuitive reasoning behind the second result in relation
to the current tablet PC market. When the dierence in the quality of the
goods is suciently large, or the marginal cost of the high-quality good of
its rival is high, the ecient rm, for example Apple, increases its output of
4The readers may think that our model setting in which both rms supply two vertically
dierentiated products in the same market, seems to be too limited. In other paper,
Kitamura and Shinkai (2014), we show that when a rm (say rm 1) chooses to expand its
product line or supply only one type of good, while another rm (rm 2) sells both goods,
then rm 1 has an incentive to produce both goods. Thefore, we focus on the model in
which both rms supply two vertically dierentiated products to the same market.
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the high-quality iPad. In contrast, if its rival, the inecient rm (for exam-
ple, Samsung), can produce a high-quality tablet (owing to its research and
development eorts) at a lower cost than that of Apple, or if the dierence
in the quality of the goods becomes small, then Apple expands production of
the lower-quality iPad Mini, which cannibalizes the larger iPad. Then, Sam-
sung's new tablet cannibalizes sales of its existing 10.1-inch tablet. However,
unless the market has goods that are extremely dierentiated or extremely
similar in terms of quality, cannibalization does not keep one of the rms'
products from the market.5
In typical models of horizontal or vertical product dierentiation, each
rm produces only one kind of good, given exogenously, which diers from
that of its rival. For example, Ellison (2005), whose study is closely related
to the present study, analyzes a market in which each rm sells a high-end
and low-end version of the same product. Although each rm produces two
dierentiated goods, the two goods are sold in dierent markets, each with
dierent types of consumers.6
In existing literature on vertical product dierentiation, the quality of
goods that rms produce is treated as an endogenous variable. For example,
in Bonanno (1986) and Motta (1993), rms initially choose a quality level
5From the article in the web news,\Samsung's Brand Cannibalization," Samsung oc-
casionally improves its products, which kills its existing product in the market. The
launch of the 10.1 inch Galaxy Note (Samsung's latest tablet) will most likely can-
nibalize sales of the existing 10.1 inch tablet. However, Samsung does not mind, as
one of the best ways to continue to exist in a competitive market is to eradicate
your own goods. See http://www.indianprice.com/mobiles/articles/15-samsungs-brand-
cannibalization.html for more detail.
6This model combines vertical dierentiation (two distinct qualities) and horizontal
dierentiation (two rms located at distinct points in a linear city).
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and then compete in Cournot or Bertrand fashion in an oligopolistic market.7
However, all of these studies stated above do not consider rms that
sell multiple products, dierentiated in terms of quality (vertically), in the
same market. In dealing with cannibalization in such a market, our model
needs to allow for a multi-product rm that diers in terms of its features
or characteristics. Few previous studies address an oligopolistic market with
such rms, although Johnson and Myatt (2003) are a notable exception.8
According to Johnson and Myatt (2003), rms that sell multiple quality-
dierentiated products frequently change their product lines when a competi-
tor enters the market. They explain the common strategies of using \ghting
brands" and \pruning" product lines. That is, unlike this study, they endo-
genize not only the quality level of each good, but also the number of goods
that each rm supplies in the market.
In literature on product line design, Desai(2001) considers two seg-
ments duopoly markets for high-quality and low-quality goods represented
by Hotelling type model. He examines whether the cannibalization problem
aects a rm's price and quality decision. He characterises such eects by
consumers' dierences in quality valuations and in their taste preferences.
Gilbert and Matutes (1993) explore vertically dierentiated products' com-
petition in the two segment market by focusing the product lines of two spa-
tially dierentiated rms. Under the exogenous quality levels assumption,
they examine whether both of rms would specialize to serve one segment
each and characterize this by the dierentiation between two rms.
7For detain on Cournot model and Bertrant model, see Cornot(1838) and
Bertrand(1883).
8For the sake of simplicity, we focus on a duopoly model.
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Our study's results are also related to those of marketing studies on prod-
uct segmentation and product distribution strategies. For example, Calzada
and Valletti (2012) study a model of lm distribution and consumption.
They consider a lm studio that can release two versions of one lm|one
for theatres and one for video{ although they do not consider oligopolis-
tic competition between lm studios. In their model, a lm studio decides
on its versioning strategy and sequencing strategy. The versioning strategy
involves the simultaneous release of the two versions, while the sequencing
strategy involves the sequential release of the versions. They show that the
optimal strategy for the studio is to introduce versioning if their goods are
not close substitutes for each other. The \versioning strategy" in their model
corresponds to the simultaneous supply of high- and low-quality goods as in
our model. In the case of sequential supply in their model, the lm stu-
dio supplies the high-quality lm version in theatres and then launches the
low-quality DVD version to the same market although we do not consider
\sequential strategy" in this paper.
We establish a result which indirectly supports the above result in Calzada
and Valletti (2012). Thus, when the dierence in quality between the high-
quality good and the low-quality good is large to some extent and so they are
not close substitutes for each other, we show that both of rms had better
supply both of goods in the market, that is, they should obey `versioning
strategy.'
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
present our model and derive a duopoly equilibrium with two vertically dif-
16
ferentiated products in a market. Furthermore, we use comparative statistics
of the equilibrium output to explore how the quality of goods, cost asym-
metry, and cannibalization are related. In section 3, we conduct a welfare
analysis of the duopoly model that we present in section 2. Finally, section
4 concludes the paper and oers suggestions for possible future research.
1.2 The Model and the Derivation of an Equi-
librium
Suppose there are two rms, i = 1; 2, and each produce two goods (good H
and good L) that dier in terms of quality, where 1 and 2 imply rm 1 and
rm 2 in the duopoly case, respectively. Let VH and VL denote the quality
level of the two goods. Then, the maximum amount consumers are willing
to pay for each good is assumed to be VH > VL > 0. Further, we assume
VH = (1+)VL, where  represents the dierence in quality between the two
goods, and we normalize the quality of the low-quality good as VL = 1, for
simplicity. Good (= H;L) is assumed to be homogeneous for any consumer.
First, we describe the consumers' behavior in our model.
Following the standard specication in the literature, for example, Katz
and Shapiro (1985), we assume there is a continuum of consumers charac-
terized by a taste parameter, , which is uniformly distributed between 0
and r(> 0), with density 1. We further assume that a consumer of type
 2 [0; r];for r > 0, obtains a net surplus from one unit of good  from rm
i at price pi. Thus, the utility (net benet) of consumer  who buys good
17
 (= H;L) from rm i (= 1; 2) is given by
Ui() = V   pi i =; 1; 2  = H;L: (1.1)
Each consumer decides to buy either nothing or one unit of good  from rm
i to maximize his/her surplus.
Before deriving the inverse demand of each good, we present three further
assumptions about the consumers in our model.
First, there exists a consumer, ^i 2 [0; r], who is indierent between the
two goods of the same rm; that is,
UiH(^i) = UiL(^i) > 0; i = 1; 2. (1.2)
Second, there always exists a consumer, iL; i = 1; 2;, who is indierent
between purchasing good L and purchasing nothing in the duopoly.
To derive a duopoly equilibrium, we need one other key assumption.
Finally, in the duopoly, for an arbitrary type- consumer,
U1() = U2();  = H;L: (1.3)
This last assumption implies that the net surplus of consumer  must be
the same whether buying a good produced by rm 1 or a good produced by
rm 2, as long as the two rms produce the same quality of good  and have
positive sales.
From these assumptions, we can derive and illustrate the demand for
good H and good L using a line segment, as shown in Figure 1.1, where
18
Q = qi + qj;  = H;L; i; j = 1; 2:
9
Here, b, the threshold between the demand for product H and for L, is
given by
b = 1

(pH   pL): (1.4)
Then, the inverse demand functions can be obtained in the following
manner: 8>><>>:
pH = (1 + )(r  QH) QL
pL = r  QH  QL:
(1.5)
Moreover, suppose that each rm has constant returns to scale and that
ciH > ciL = cjL = cL = 0, where ci is rm i's marginal and average cost
of good . This implies that a high-quality good incurs a higher cost of
production than a low-quality good.10 Under these assumptions, each rm's
prot is dened in the following manner:
i = (piH   ciH)qiH + piLqiL i = 1; 2; (1.6)
where pi is the price of good  sold by rm i, and qi is the rm's output of
good . Each rm chooses the quantity to supply that maximizes this prot
function in Cournot fashion.
To maximize prot function (1.6), each rm determines the quantity of
9The demand function is similar to that derived in Bonanno (1986), but it is dierent
from that in Bonnano in that both rms supply two vertically dierentiated products in
the same market. For the derivation of the demand, see Kitamura and Shinkai (2013) in
detail.
10For details on the symmetric costs version of our analysis, see Kitamura and Shinkai
(201b).
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goods to produce, qiH and qiL, in the following manner:
max
qiH ;qiL
i:
Here, we set c2H > c1H > ciL = 0, which means that rm 1 is more ecient
than rm 2. The rst-order conditions for prot maximization are as follows:
 (1 + )q1H + (1 + )(r  QH) QL   c1H   q1L = 0
 (1 + )q2H + (1 + )(r  QH) QL   c2H   q2L = 0
 q1H + r  QH  QL   q1L = 0
 q2H + r  QH  QL   q2L = 0.
Solving this system, we obtain the following Nash equilibrium quantities:
8>><>>:
q1H =
r
3
  2c1H c2H
3
; q1L =
2c1H c2H
3
q2H =
r
3
  2c2H c1H
3
; q2L =
2c2H c1H
3
:
(1.7)
For qiH and q

iL to be positive, we assume that
 >
2c2H   c1H
r
and c1H >
1
2
c2H : (1.8)
Hence, the total equilibrium output, Q, becomes constant:
Q = Q1 +Q

2 = Q

H +Q

L =
2
3
r, (1.9)
where Qi = Q

i +Q

i; i = 1; 2; ;  = H;L.
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From (1.5) and (1.7), we obtain the following equilibrium prices of the
goods:
pH =
(1 + )r + c1H + c2H
3
; pL =
r
3
. (1.10)
We also have the equilibrium prot of rm i:
i =
(1 + )r2   2(2ciH   cjH)r + (2ciH   cjH)2
9
; i = 1; 2 ; i 6= j
(1.11)
Then, the equilibrium outputs of (1.7) lead to the following condition for
cannibalization: We have
q1H   q2H =
1
3
(2c2H   c1H   (2c1H   c2H)) (1.12)
= q2L   q1L
=
1

(c2H   c1H) > 0.
We also conrm the dierence in the prots of the two rms, as follows:
2   1 = 1
3
(c1H   c2H)(2r   c1H   c2H) < 0; (1.13)
since  >
2c2H   c1H
r
>
c1H + c2H
2 r
and c1H < c2H .
Hence, we can easily establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1 Although the ecient rm (rm 1) produces more of
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high-quality good H than the inecient rm (rm 2), the inecient rm
sells more of the low-quality good L than the ecient rm. Furthermore, if
the dierence in unit costs between the two rms is suciently small (i.e.,
if 2c1H = c2H), then the ecient rm does not produce the low-quality good.
The ecient rm 1 earns more than the inecient rm 2 does.
The proposition implies that the ecient rm 1 earns more than the inef-
cient rm 2 because of cost eciency of rm 1 over rm 2 on the high-quality
good H under the positive outputs assumption (1.8) in the equilibrium.
Next, we examine under which conditions the cannibalization from one
product to another occurs in the equilibrium. Note that we say \a prod-
uct cannibalizes a similar product" when a rm increases the output of the
product by reducing that of the similar product supplied in the same market.
From (1.7), we have
q2H   q2L =
1
3
(r   2(2c2H   c1H)

) R 0
,  R 2(2c2H   c1H)
r
, q2H R q2L (1.14)
and
q2H   q1L =
r
3
  2c2H   c1H
3
  2c1H   c2H
3
= q1H   q2L =
1
3
(r   (c2H + c1H))
R 0()  R c2H + c1H
r
. (1.15)
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From (1.8), we also see that
c1H + c2H
r
>
2c2H   c1H
r
.
Then, from the above inequality, (1.15), (1.14), and proposition 2.1, we
immediately obtain
q2H  q1L < q1H  q2L for
2c2H   c1H
r
<   c1H + c2H
r
;
q1L < q

2H < q

2L < q

1H for
c1H + c2H
r
<  <
2(2c2H   c1H)
r
;
q1L < q

2L  q2H < q1H for
2(2c2H   c1H)
r
 . (1.16)
Thus, we present the following proposition, without proof.
Proposition 1.2 In the duopoly equilibrium derived above, if the dif-
ference in the quality of the two goods, , is suciently small (i.e.,  2
(2c2H c1H
r
; c1H+c2H
r
] ), then q2H  q1L < q1H  q2L. As  approaches 2c2H c1Hr
from above, product L of rm 2 cannibalizes product H and q2H approaches
0. When  grows, product H of both rms always cannibalizes product L:
As  grows and approaches c1H+c2H
r
, and q2H approaches q

1L . If  is
included in the median value range (i.e.,  2 ( c1H+c2H
r
; 2(2c2H c1H)
r
) ), then
q1L < q

2H < q

2L < q

1H . As  grows and approaches
2(2c2H c1H)
r
, q2H ap-
proaches q2L . However, if  is suciently high (i.e.,  2 (2(2c2H c1H)r ;1)),
then q1L < q

2L  q2H < q1H . As  approaches 1 , q1L and q2L vanish.
The intuition behind Proposition 1.2 is straightforward. When the dier-
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ence in the quality of the two goods is suciently small, the inecient rm
produces far more of low-quality good L, with no production cost, than it
does of high-quality good H, which has a higher positive cost. In contrast,
the ecient rm produces moderately more of its low-quality good L than
it does of good H, since its production cost for good H is lower than that
of its rival. However, its marginal revenue from good H is not high, because
the dierence in the quality of the two goods is very small.
Thus, interestingly, as  approaches (2c2H   c1H)=r from (1.7), q2H ap-
proaches 0. Thus, the inecient rm 2 stops producing the high-quality
good H, almost specializing in the low-quality good. Then, in equilibrium,
the market approaches a three-goods market. This market is lled with large
quantities of the low-quality good L supplied by both of rms, but relatively
little of the high-quality good H supplied by rm 1.
This result is consistent with the result in Calzada and Valletti (2012)
that the optimal strategy for the lm studio is to introduce versioning if their
goods are not close substitutes for each other. Thus, when the dierence
in quality between the high-quality good H and the low-quality good L is
large to some extent, we can consider that they are not close substitutes
for each other. Then, the result in the above proposition asserts that both
of rms had better supply both of goods in the market, that is, to obey
`versioning strategy,' in Calzada and Valletti (2012). On the other hand,
if the dierence in quality of two goods reduces to nearly zero and they
become close substitutes each other, the best strategy of the inecient rm
2 is to vanish the output of its high-quality goods H and to specialize in the
low-quality good L!
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When the dierence in the quality of the two goods becomes high, the
ecient rm produces far more of the high-quality good than it does of the
low-quality good, because it is protable to do so. However, the inecient
rm also reduces the output of its low-quality good and increases that of its
high-quality good, because the protability of good H becomes large, even
though the inecient rm's production cost is higher than that of its rival.
In this case, as  approaches (c1H + c2H)=r from (1.7), q

2H approaches
q1L. As  increases further over (c1H + c2H)=r, the cannibalization from the
low-quality good to the high-quality good of ecient rm 1 increases, since
the benet to the ecient rm 1 of supplying the high-quality good over the
low-quality good increases. However, the same benet to the inecient rm
2 decreases, until the former surpasses the latter. Then, as  approaches
2(2c2H   c1H)=r, q2H approaches q2L. Lastly, as  increases further over
2(2c2H   c1H)=r to innity, q1L and q2L vanish and both rms only produce
their high-quality goods H.
Next, we analyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium outputs and
prots of the rms for dierences in the quality and in the marginal costs of
good H.
Proposition 1.3 In the duopoly equilibrium derived above, when the dif-
ference in the quality of the two goods, , or the marginal cost of high-quality
good H of competitor cjH increases (decreases), then cannibalization occurs
in the outputs of rm i such that the supply of high-quality (low-quality)
good H (L) increases at the expense of one of low-quality (high-quality) good
L (H). However, if the marginal cost of its own high-quality good H, ciH ,
25
increases (decreases), then cannibalization occurs in the outputs of rm i
such that the supply of low-quality (high-quality) good L (H) increases at the
expense of one of high-quality (low-quality) good H (L).
From (1.11), we have
@i
@
=
(r + 2ciH   cjH)(r   (2ciH   cjH))
92
> 0; i = 1; 2. (1.17)
Furthermore, we also check the eects of production costs on prot. From
(1.11), we have
@i
@ciH
=  4
9
(r   2ciH   cjH

) < 0;
@i
@cjH
=
2
9
(r   2ciH   cjH

) > 0 .
Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1.4 When the dierence in the quality of the two goods
increases, the equilibrium prots of both rms increase. Furthermore, a de-
crease in the marginal cost of a rm's own good H or an increase in the
marginal cost of the competitor's good H increases the prot of the rm.
This proposition is plausible. When the dierence in the quality between
two goods is suciently small, the inecient rm produces more of the low-
quality good than it does of the high-quality good, from equation (1.16), to
avoid suering from the positive marginal cost of producing the high-quality
good. Then, an increase in the dierence in the quality of the two goods, ,
or a decrease in the unit cost of a rm's own good H or an increase in the unit
cost of its competitor's good H induces this rm to produce more of the high-
quality good. Thus, it reduces the quantity of the low-quality good L because
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of cannibalization. However, from equations (1.7) and (1.16), the proportion
of the cannibalization from the low-quality good to the high-quality good in
both rms is dierent. That of the ecient rm 1 is lower than that of the
inecient rm 2 because of the cost eciency of rm 1 for the high-quality
good.11 Similarly, if the dierence in quality is suciently small, a decrease
in a rm's own unit cost of good H or an increase in the unit cost of the rival
rm has a similar eect on both rms' proportions of cannibalization from
the low-quality good to the high-quality good.
However, if the dierence in quality between the goods  becomes su-
ciently large, the ecient rm 1 produces more of the high-quality good and
reduces the quantity of the low-quality good because of its cost eciency in
the case of the high-quality good. Then, the inecient rm 2 reduces the
quantity of the low-quality good and increases the output of the high-quality
good to limit the reduction in its prot owing to the cannibalization from
the low-quality good to the high-quality good. In the case of a decrease in
a rm's own unit cost of good H or an increase in the unit cost of the rival
rm when the dierence in quality between the goods, , is large, the eect
is similar to the eect on both rms' proportions of cannibalization from the
low-quality good to the high-quality good. The changes in , ciH ,and ciH
11From (1.7), the proportions of the cannibalization for rm 1 and rm 2 from the
low-quality good to high-quality good owing to an increase in the dierence in quality are
expressed by
Canniba1qL!H()  @q1H=@  @q1L=@ = ((2c1H   c2H)  (2c2H   c1H)) =(32)
= 2(2c1H   c2H)=(32);
and
Canniba2qL!H()  @q21H=@  @q2L=@ = ((2c2H   c1H)  (2c2H   c1H)) =(32)
= 2(2c2H   c1H)=(32), respectively. Hence,
Canniba1qL!H()  Canniba2qL!H() = 2(c2H   c1H)=2 > 0.
Furthermore, from (1.16), we see that
q1H   q1L < q2L   q2H if 2c2H c1Hr <  < c1H+c2Hr .
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mean that the increase in the prot of rm 1 surpasses that of rm 2.12
1.3 Welfare Analysis with Asymmetric Cost
In this section, we describe the comparative statics of the social welfare in
the equilibrium.
The social surplus in equilibrium, derived in the preceding section, is
given by
W  =
Z ^
r
3
d +
Z r
^
(1 + )d   c1Hq1H   c2Hq2H (1.18)
=  
2
(^)2   r
2
18
+
(1 + )r2
2
  c1Hq1H   c2Hq2H :
First, we explore the eect of a change in unit cost on social welfare.
From (1.4) and (1.7)
@W 
@ciH
=
11ciH   7cjH   4r
9
i = 1; 2:
Thus, 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@W 
@c1H
< 0
@W 
@c2H
> 0 if 2c2H c1H
r
  < 11c2H 7c1H
4r
@W 
@c2H
 0 if 11c2H 7c1H
4r
 :
(1.19)
Finally, we show that a change in the dierence in quality between the
12For an increase in , we see that
@1
@   @

2
@ = (c1H + c2H)(c2H   c1H)=(32) > 0, since c2H > c1H > 0, from (1.17). The
argument is similar for a decrease in ciH and an increase in cjH .
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two goods always has a positive eect on social welfare, as follows:
@W 
@
=
82r2   11c21H   11c22H + 14c1Hc2H
182
(1.20)
The sign of @W =@ is determined by the sign of the numerator of (1.20),
where we dene the numerator by W n (r), and W
n
 (r) is a quadratic in r.
Evaluating W n (r) at r = (2c2H   c1H)=, we have
W n (
2c2H   c1H

) = 3(7c22H   c21H   6c1Hc2H)
= 3(c2H   c1H)(7c2H + c1H) > 0; (* c2H > c1H)(1.21)
and we see that the slope of W n (r) with respect to r is
@W n (r)
@r

r=
2c2H c1H

= 16(2c2H   c1H) > 0.
Then, we obtain
@W 

> 0. (1.22)
Thus, we show that an increase in the dierence between the two goods
improves social welfare. From (1.19) and (1.22), we have following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 1.5 The social surplus in equilibrium increases with
1. a decrease in the marginal cost of the ecient rm for the high-quality
good.
2. a decrease (increase) in the unit cost of the inecient rm when pro-
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ducing the high-quality good if the dierence in quality is suciently
large (small).
Moreover, an increase in the dierence between the two goods always in-
creases the social surplus in equilibrium.
The second part of this proposition is both interesting and counter-
intuitive, because we may think that an increase in the production cost would
lead to a decrease in social welfare. However, a case exists in which social wel-
fare improves if there is an increase in the marginal cost of the high-quality
good. The reason is that when the dierence in quality is small, the increase
in the marginal cost of the inecient rm leads to a reduction in the total
cost; (@Total cost)=@c2H < 0. This has a positive eect on social welfare.
On the other hand, the eect on total consumer utility is always negative;
(@Total utility)=@c2H < 0. Thus, when the positive eect of the former
dominates the negative eect of the latter, the social surplus in equilibrium
increases because the unit cost to the inecient rm of producing good H
is high and the dierence in quality is suciently small. In Lahiri and Ono
(1988), they show that a marginal cost reduction of a rm with a suciently
low share can decrease welfare by production substitution. This proposition
reappears their nding by multi-product rm and cannibalization.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we considered and proposed a duopoly model of cannibalization
in which two rms each produce and sell two distinct products that are dier-
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entiated vertically in the same market. Then, we showed that in the market
equilibrium, the ecient rm produces more of the high-quality good and the
inecient rm produces more of the low-quality good. When the dierence
in the quality of the two types of goods is small (large), cannibalization for
rm 2 (rm 1) is stronger than that for rm 1 (rm 2).
Furthermore, we presented several comparative statics and established
that an increase in the dierence in the quality of the two types of goods (a
reduction in the marginal cost of producing its own high-quality good) leads
to cannibalization such that the high-quality good drives the low-quality good
out of the market. Similarly, a decrease in the dierence in the quality of the
two goods (an increase in the marginal cost of the high-quality good of the
competitor) causes cannibalization such that the low-quality good drives the
high-quality good out of the market. However, unless the market has goods
that are extremely dierentiated or extremely similar in terms of quality,
cannibalization does not keep one product of a rm from the market, and
rms supply both goods. Furthermore, we characterize graphically product
line strategies of rms by the two ratios relationship and established that
the change in the quality superiority and the relative cost eciency ratios
causes cannibalization, so that it crucially aects the decision making of
rm's product line.
We also presented an intuitive explanation for these comparative statics.
In relating to the results in marketing studies on product segmentation and
product distribution strategies, we also establish a result which is consistent
with the result in Calzada and Valletti (2012) that the optimal strategy
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for the lm studio is to introduce versioning if their goods are not close
substitutes for each other. Thus, when the dierence in quality between the
high-quality good and the low-quality good is large to some extent and so
they are not close substitutes for each other, we show that both of rms
had better supply both of goods in the market, that is, they should obey
`versioning strategy.'
Then, we conducted a welfare analysis and showed that an increase in
the dierence between the two goods and a decrease in the production costs
of the high-quality good for the ecient rm always increase social welfare.
However, an increase in the marginal cost of producing the high-quality good
for the inecient rm does not always harm social welfare. In particular, if
the dierence in quality is suciently small, rather counter-intuitively, an
increase in the unit cost of the high-quality good for the inecient rm
improves social welfare.
Extensions to this study in future research are possible. For example, it
would be useful to analyze a case in which each rm can choose its quality
level as well as the number of goods it produces. In addition, in this study,
we do not consider a market with network externality, which would be worth
studying if we consider a market such as the tablet PC industry described in
section 2. Indeed, we are analyzing such a market in another study.
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Chapter 2
Product Line Strategy in a
Vertically Dierentiated
Duopoly
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abstract1
In real oligopolistic market, we often rms supply several own products
dierentiated in quality in a same market. To explore why oligopolistic rms
do so, we consider a duopoly model in which rms with dierent costs supply
two vertically dierentiated products in the same market. We characterize
graphically product line strategies of rms by the change in the quality su-
periority and the relative cost eciency ratios.
Keywords: Multi-product rm; Duopoly; Cannibalization; Vertical product
dierentiation
1The authors are grateful to Tommaso Valletti, Federico Etro, Hong Hwang, Noriaki
Matsushima, Toshihiro Matsumura, Kenji Fujiwara, and Keizo Mizuno for their useful
comments on an earlier version of this paper. The second author was supported by Grants-
in-Aid for Scientic Research (Nos. 23330099 and 24530255) MEXT. Furthermore, this
chapter is sum of the revised version of Kitamura and Shinkai (2015a) and a part of
Kitamura and Shinkai (2015b).
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2.1 Introduction
As a mentioned in previous chapter, there are oligopolistic markets in which
rms produce and sell multiple products that are vertically dierentiated
within the same market. Such markets present more cases of cannibaliza-
tion. Cannibalization within the same market occurs when a rm increases
the output of one of its products by reducing the output of a similar compet-
ing product in the same market. The objective of this study is to examine
cannibalization within the same market from strategic point of view of the
multi-product rm which supplies two goods dierentiated in quality. We
do not consider new entries to the market and choice of quality level as con-
sidered in Johnson and Myatt (2003). We consider a duopoly in which each
rm produces and supplies two kinds of vertically dierentiated high-quality
and low-quality goods in a market. Then, we explore the condition under
which both or either of rms specialize(s) in one of the high or low-quality
goods. To understand how cannibalization aects product line strategies of
rms, we consider two ratio indicators: (1) the predominance quality ratio
of high-quality good to that of lowquality; and (2) the relative marginal cost
eciency of high-quality good between the two rms. We nd that canni-
balization can be seen as a product line control strategy characterized by the
quality superiority of high-quality good to low-quality and the relative cost
eciency of an ecient rm. By limiting at most two vertically dierentiated
goods that each rm can supply to the same market, we succeed in charac-
terizing product line strategies of rms through cannibalization graphically
in the plane of these two ratio indicators.
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2.2 Product Line Strategy
2The objective of this section is to examine more correctly substitution of
products within the same market from strategic point of view of the multi-
product rm which supplies two goods dierentiated in quality. For this
purpose, we consider a duopoly game with two vertically dierentiated prod-
ucts under nonnegative outputs constraints, provided that any rival's product
line strategies are given.
At rst, we set r = 1, c2H > c1H = 1 and VH = 
0
VL = 
0
> VL = 1. In
this section, each rm simultaneously chooses the output (outputs) of for H
or L (both) type(s) of product(s) to supply that maximizes this prot func-
tion in Cournot fashion under nonnegativitiy outputs constraints provided
that its rival also chooses nonnegativity output(s). Thus rm i has a belief on
its rival's any product line strategies sj2 Sj  f(0; 0); (+; 0); (0;+); (+;+)g,
where (0; 0) implies (qjH = 0; qjL = 0), (+; 0) implies (qjH > 0; qjL = 0) and
so on. For any given sj2 Sj
max
qiH ;qiL
i = f0(1 QH) QL   ciH)qiH + (1 QH  QL)qiL (2.1)
s:t: qiH  0; qiL  0; i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2.
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
@i
@qiH
 0; @i
@qiL
 0; (2.2)
2This section is a revised version of Kitamura and Shinkai (2015b).
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qiH  @i
@qiH
= qiL  @i
@qiL
= 0; (2.3)
qiH  0; qiL  0. (2.4)
Each rm chooses its product line strategy of two vertically dierentiated
products, that is, whether it produces positive (zero) quantities of product
H and L under its belief on its rival rm's product line strategies.
There are sixteen cases to be solved according to each rm's product line
strategies under its beliefs on its rival rm's product line strategies except
for the trivial case in that both rms never produces both products H and
L. After some tiresome calculations, we can show that ten cases out of these
sixteen cases have no equilibrium in the correspondent games. Hence, we
have the following.3
Proposition 2.1 In the duopoly equilibrium of the game under rival's
nonnegative quantities belief presented above, the following ve cases have an
equilibrium in the correspondent games.
(Case A) qA1H = q
A
2H = 0; q
A
1L > 0; q
A
2L > 0; i 
0  2:
(Case B) qB1L = q
B
2H = 0; q
B
2L > 0; q
B
1H > 0 i
4  0  1
2
(2c2H +
q
2(2c22H   c2H + 2)):
3See Appendix for these calculations.
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(Case C) qC1L = 0; q
C
2L > 0; q
C
1H > 0; q
C
2H > 0 i
1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4) < 
0
; 
0
> 2  c2H and c2H  2:
(Case D) qD1L > 0; q
D
2L > 0; q
D
1H > 0; q
D
2H = 0 i
2 < 
0
< 4 and 
0  2c2H .
(Case E) qE1L > 0; q
E
2L > 0; q
E
1H > 0; q
E
2H > 0 i
1 < c2H < 2; 
0
> 3  c2H and 0 > 2c2H :
The details of Proposition 2.1 is as follows.
(Case A) qA1H = q
A
2H = 0; q
A
1L > 0; q
A
2L > 0
qA1H = q
A
2H = 0 < q
A
1L = q
A
2L =
1
3
and 
0  2; (2.5)
where the last inequality needs for the Kuhn-Tucker condition to be sat-
ised.
(Case B) qB1L = q
B
2H = 0; q
B
2L > 0; q
B
1H > 0
We have
qB1L = q
B
2H = 0; q
B
1H =
1
40   1(2
0   3); qB2L =
1
40   1(
0
+ 1) (2.6)
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and
4  0  1
2
(2c2H +
q
2(2c22H   c2H + 2));
where the last inequality needs for the Kuhn-Tucker condition to be sat-
ised.
(Case C) qC1L = 0; q
C
2L > 0; q
C
1H > 0; q
C
2H > 0
qC1L = 0; q
C
2L =
1
2(0   1)c2H ; q
C
1H =
1
30
(
0
+ c2H   2); (2.7)
qC2H =
1
60(0   1)(2
0
(
0   1)  (40   1)c2H + 2(0   1))
qC1H > q
C
2H ; q
C
2L > 0 and q
C
2H R qC2L ,
1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) S 
0
;
and
1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4) < 
0 , qC2H > 0
hold. Furthermore, from the Kuhn-Tucker condition, we have
c2H  2. (2.8)
For qC1H > 0, the inequality, 
0
> 2   c2H is necessary to hold. This is
hold since c2H  2.
(Case D) qD1L > 0; q
D
2L > 0; q
D
1H > 0; q
D
2H = 0
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qD1L =
1
6(0   1)(4  
0
); qD2L =
1
3
; qD1H =
1
(0   1)(
0   2); qD2H = 0: (2.9)
For qD1L and q
D
1H are positive values, we have
2 < 
0
< 4.
We also have
qD1L R qD1H , 
0 S 5
2
and 
0  2c2H ,
where the last inequality has to hold for the Kuhn{Tucker condition to
be satised.
(Case E) qE1L > 0; q
E
2L > 0; q
E
1H > 0; q
E
2H > 0
qE1L =
1
3(0   1)(2  c2H); q
E
2L =
1
3(0   1)(2c2H   1); (2.10)
qE1H =
1
3(0   1)(
0
+ c2H   3); qE2H =
1
3(0   1)(
0   2c2H):
For qE1L > 0 and q
E
1L > 0,
1 < c2H < 2
is necessary to hold. We see that qE1H > q
E
2H under this condition. For
qE1H > 0 and q
E
2H > 0, we see that
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
0
> 3  c2H and 0 > 2c2H
are necessary to hold, respectively. We also have
qE1H R qE1L , 
0 R 5  2c2H , qE2H R qE1L and qE2L R qE1H , 
0 R c2H + 2
Furthermore we also show that
qE2H R qE2L , 
0 R 4c2H   1.
Summarizing above results, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2 In the duopoly equilibrium of the game under rival's
nonnegative quantities belief presented above, the next inequalities hold among
the outputs of high-quality good and low quality good of each rm:
0 < qE2H < q
E
1H  qE1L < qE2L
for (c2H ; 
0
) 2 f(c2H ; 0) 2 R2++ j 0 > 2c2H ; 0  5  2c2H and 1 < c2H < 5
4
g (I' ),
0 < qE2H < q
E
1L < q
E
1H < q
E
2L for (c2H ; 
0
) 2
f(c2H ; 0) 2 R2++ j 0 > 2c2H ; 0 > 5  2c2H ; 0 < c2H + 2 and 1 < c2H < 2g (I ),
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0 < qE1L  qE2H < qE2L < qE1H for (c2H ; 
0
) 2
f(c2H ; 0) 2 R2++ j 0  c2H + 2; 0 < 4c2H   1; and 1 < c2H < 2g (II ),
0 < qE1L < q
E
2L  qE2H < qE1H for (c2H ; 
0
) 2
f(c2H ; 0) 2 R2++ j 0  4c2H   1; and 1 < c2H < 2g (III ),
qC1L = 0 < q
C
2L  qC2H < qC1H for (c2H ; 
0
) 2
f(c2H ; 0) 2 R2++ j
1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) > 
0  1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4) > 4
; c2H  2g (VI ),
qC1L = 0 < q
C
2H < q
C
2L < q
C
1H for (c2H ; 
0
) 2
f(c2H ; 0) 2 R2++ j 0 > 1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) > 4; c2H  2g (V),
qB1H  qB2L > qB1L = qB2H = 0 for (c2H ; 
0
) 2
f(c2H ; 0) 2 R2++ j 4  0  (2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4)=2g (IV ),
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qD2L =
1
3
> qD1L  qD1H > qD2H = 0 when 1 < 
0  5
2
; 
0  2c2H (V III);
qD2L =
1
3
> qD1H > q
D
1L > q
D
2H = 0 when
5
2
< 
0
< 4; 
0  2c2H (VII ),
qA1H = q
A
2H = 0 < q
A
1L = q
A
2L =
1
3
when1 < 
0  2 (IX ),
where Roman numbers imply the area in c2H   0 plane in Figure 2.1,
respectively.
We present classication of product line strategy of the duopoly game
under rival's nonnegative output belief in c2H   0 plane in Figure 2.1.
Hence, the horizontal and the vertical axes variable in Figure 2.1 implies
the relative cost ratio c2H and the quality value ratio 
0
. In any point (c2H ; 
0
)
belonging to Areas I, II and III in Figure 2.1, both rms supply high and
low-quality goods. Thus, as the quality value ratio 
0
is suciently high and
the relative cost ratio c2H is also small in these areas, the inecient rm
produces far more of low-quality good, with no production cost, than it does
of high-quality, which has a higher positive cost. In contrast, the ecient
rm produces moderately more of its high-quality good H than it does of
good L, since its production cost for good H is lower than that of its rival.
However, its marginal revenue from good H is not high, because the quality
superiority 
0
is not so large. As the point (c2H ; 
0
) moves from area I to
areas II and III, the cannibalization from low-quality to high-quality of both
rms proceeds. Such cannibalization of the ecient rm is stronger than
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that of the inecient rms.
This result is consistent with the result in Calzada and Valletti (2012)
that the optimal strategy for the lm studio is to introduce versioning if their
goods are not close substitutes for each other. Thus, when the predominance
in quality value of the high-quality good H is large to some extent, we can
consider that they are not close substitutes for each other. Then, the result
in the above proposition asserts that both of rms had better supply both
of goods in the market, that is, to obey `versioning strategy,' in Calzada and
Valletti (2012).
In contrast, when relative cost eciency c2H is large (Areas from IV to
IX) the ecient rm never supplies its low-quality good, thus in equilibrium,
the market becomes a three-goods market at rst. In this market is lled
with large quantities of the low-quality good L supplied by both of rms, but
relatively little of the high-quality good H supplied by rm 1. As the quality
superiority 
0
reduces further, the inecient rm 2 stops producing the high-
quality good H specializing in the low-quality good. Then,the ecient rm
1 specializes in high-quality good supply and the inecient rm 2 does in
low-quality good supply, respectively.
2.3 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we considered a duopoly model of cannibalization in which
two rms each produce and sell two distinct products that are dierentiated
vertically in the same market.
Then, we established that the change in the quality superiority and the
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relative cost eciency ratios causes cannibalization, so that it crucially af-
fects the decision making of rm's product line. Furthermore, we consider
a duopoly game with two vertically dierentiated products under nonnega-
tive outputs constraints and the belief on its rival's product line strategies.
Further, we derive an equilibrium for the game and characterize graphically
rms' product line strategies through the quality superiority and the relative
cost eciency ratios.
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Figure 2.1 Classication of Product Line Strategy in c2H   0 Plane with
Non-negativity Outputs Belief (r = 1)
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Appendix
In this model, there are following sixteen types according to each rm's
product line strategies.
(1) q1H = q2H = q1L = q2L = 0
(2) q1H > 0; q2H = q1L = q2L = 0
(3) q1H > 0; q2H > 0; q1L = q2L = 0
(4) q1H > 0; q2H > 0; q1L > 0; q2L = 0
(5) q1H > 0; q2H > 0; q1L > 0; q2L > 0
(6) q2H > 0; q1H = q1L = q2L = 0
(7) q2H > 0; q1L > 0; q1H = q2L = 0
(8) q2H > 0; q1L > 0; q2L > 0; q1H = 0
(9) q1L > 0; q1H = q2H = q2L = 0
(10) q1L > 0; q2L > 0; q1H = q2H = 0
(11) q2L > 0; q1H = q2H = q1L = 0
(12) q2L > 0; q1H > 0; q2H = q1L = 0
(13) q1H > 0; q1L > 0; q2H = q2L = 0
(14) q2H > 0; q2L > 0; q1H = q1L = 0
(15) q1H > 0; q1L > 0; q2L > 0; q2H = 0
(16) q1H > 0; q2H > 0; q2L > 0; q1L = 0
However, from Kuhn-Tucker conditions(2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), we have the
ve cases of equilibrium. Here, note that these Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
52
a necessary and sucient condition for existence of ve cases of equilibrium
since objective functions are concave and constraint conditions are linear in
this model. These calculations are as follows.
The inequalities (2.2) are rewritten for all types as

0   20q1H   0q2H   2q1L   q2L   1  0 (2.11)
1  2q1H   q2H   2q1L   q2L  0 (2.12)

0   20q2H   0q1H   q1L   2q2L   c2H  0 (2.13)
1  2q2H   q1H   q1L   2q2L  0 (2.14)
 The type (1):q1H = q2H = q1L = q2L = 0.
Then, since (2.12) implies 1  0, type (1) is in contradiction with Kuhn
-Tucker condition.
 The type (2): q1H > 0; q2H = q1L = q2L = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1H =

0   1
20
:
Then, since (2.12) implies 1  0, type (2) is in contradiction with Kuhn
-Tucker condition.
 The type (3): q1H > 0; q2H > 0; q1L = q2L = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1H =

0
+ c2H   2
30
; q2H =

0   2c2H + 1
30
:
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Then, since (2.12) implies 3  0, type (3) is in contradiction with Kuhn
-Tucker condition.
 The type (4): q1H > 0; q2H > 0; q1L > 0; q2L = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1H =
2(
0
)2   60 + 2(0   1)c2H + 1
60(0   1) ; q1L =
1
2(0   1) ;
q2H =
1 + 
0   2c2H
30
:
Then, although (2.14) implies 
0
+ 1 + 2(
0   1)c2H  0, it is not
satised since 
0
> 1. Thus, type (4) is in contradiction with Kuhn
-Tucker condition.
 The type (5): q1H > 0; q2H > 0; q1L > 0; q2L > 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1H =

0
+ c2H   3
3(0   1) ; q1L =
2  c2H
3(0   1) ;
q2H =

0   2c2H
3(0   1) ; q2L =
2c2H   1
3(0   1) :
Then, each equilibrium output is positive when 2c2H < 
0
, 3 c2H < 0
and c2H < 2. Thus, the equilibrium of type (15) exists i (
0
; c2H)
satisfy these three inequalities. This corresponds to the equilibrium in
the Case E.
 The type (6): q2H > 0; q1H = q1L = q2L = 0.
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From (2.3), we have
q2H =

0   c2H
20
:
Then, since (2.14) implies c2H  0, it is in contradiction with c2H  1.
 The type (7): q2H > 0; q1L > 0; q1H = q2L = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1L =

0
+ c2H
40   1 ; q2H =
2
0   2c2H   1
40   1 :
Then, (2.11) and (2.14) require following two inequalities;
1 < 
0  3  c2H +
p
c22H   2c2H + 7
2
1 + 3c2H  0 :
However, it is not satised because (3c2H +
p
c22H   2c2H + 7)=2 < 1+
3c2H . Thus, type (7) is in contradiction with Kuhn -Tucker condition.
 The type (8): q2H > 0; q1L > 0; q2L > 0; q1H = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1L =
1
3
;
q2H =

0   1  c2H
2(0   1) ; q2L =
1  0 + 3c2H
6(0   1) :
Then, although (2.11) implies (
0
)2   40 + 3 + c2H(0   1)  0, it is
not satised for any 
0
. Thus, type (8) is in contradiction with Kuhn
-Tucker condition.
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 The type (9): q1L > 0; q1H = q2H = q2L = 0.
From (2.3), we haveq1L = 1=2. Then, since (2.14) implies 1=2  0, type
(9) is in contradiction with Kuhn -Tucker conditions.
 The type (10): q1L > 0; q2L > 0; q1H = q2H = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1L = q2L =
1
3
:
Then, (2.11) and (2.13) require following two inequalities;

0  2

0  1 + c2H :
Therefore, the equilibrium of type (10) exists i (
0
; c2H) satisfy these
two inequalities. This corresponds to the equilibrium in the Case A.
 The type (11): q2L > 0; q1H = q2H = q1L = 0.
From (2.3), we haveq2L = 1=2. Then, since (2.12) implies 1=2  0, type
(11) is in contradiction with Kuhn -Tucker condition.
 The type (12): q2L > 0; q1H > 0; q2H = q1L = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1H =
2
0   3
40   1 ; q2L =

0
+ 1
40   1 :
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Then, (2.12) and (2.13) require following two inequalities;
4  0

0  2c2H +
p
2(2c22H   c2H + 2)
2
:
Therefore, the equilibrium of type (12) exists i (
0
; c2H) satisfy these
two inequalities. This corresponds to the equilibrium in the Case B.
 The type (13): q1H > 0; q1L > 0; q2H = q2L = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q1H =

0   2
2(0   1) ; q2L =
1
2(0   1) :
Then, since (2.14) implies 
0  1, it is in contradiction with 0 > 1.
 The type (14): q2H > 0; q2L > 0; q1H = q1L = 0.
From (2.3), we have
q2H =

0   c2H   1
2(0   1) ; q2L =
c2H
2(0   1) :
Then, since (2.12) implies 
0  1, it is in contradiction with 0 > 1.
 The type (15): q1H > 0; q1L > 0; q2L > 0; q2H = 0.
q1H =

0   2
2(0   1) ; q1L =
4  0
6(0   1) ;
q2L =
1
3
:
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Then, each equilibrium output is positive when 2 < 
0
< 4. More-
over, (2.13) requires 
0  2c2H . Thus, the equilibrium of type (15)
exists i (
0
; c2H) satisfy these two inequalities. This corresponds to
the equilibrium in the Case D.
 The type (16): q1H > 0; q2H > 0; q2L > 0; q1L = 0.
q1H =

0   2 + c2H
30
;
q2H =
2
0
(
0   1)  (40   1)c2H + 2(0   1)
60(0   1) ; q2L =
c2H
2(0   1) :
Then, each equilibrium output is positive when (2c2H+
p
4c22H   2c2H + 4)=2 <

0
.Furthermore, (2.12) requires 2  c2H . Thus, the equilibrium of type
(16) exists i (
0
; c2H) satisfy these two inequalities. This corresponds
to the equilibrium in the Case C.
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Chapter 3
A Monopoly model with Two
Vertically Dierentiated Goods
under Within-Product Network
Externalities
59
abstract1
Developing a monopoly model with two vertically dierentiated products
and a within-product network externality, this study examines the eect of
falling cost of high-quality goods. The result shows that both rm prot and
welfare become U-shaped in the cost, that is, cost reduction can decrease
prots. Further, I discuss how cannibalization between products plays a key
role in this counter-intuitive result.
Keywords : Multi-product rm, Monopoly, Cannibalization, Network ex-
ternality
1I thank Noriyuki Doi, Kenji Fujiwara, Hiroaki Ino, Noriaki Matsushima, Akira
Miyaoka, Tetsuya Shinkai, and Tommaso Valletti as well as the other participants at
the workshop at Kwansei Gakuin University for their useful comments. Any remaining
errors are my own. Further, this chapter is revised version of Kitamura (2015) presented
at EARIE 2015.
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3.1 Introduction
The majority of smartphone carriers sell both high-and low-quality smart-
phones.2 Network externalities in this industry exist across products supplied
by one rm and within products, that is, all consumers of a good gain, as the
number of users purchasing the same smartphone increases. Although prior
literature has explored former network externality, no study has analyzed a
market with a within-product network externality.3 This study focuses on a
within-product network externality and examines its positive and normative
consequences by considering a market with a multi-product rm.
Incorporating a within-product network externality into a multi-product
monopoly model, this study examines rm and consumer behavior, and the
resulting market congurations.4 First, I nd that cannibalization happens
under certain conditions; namely, an increase in consumers of one good occurs
at the expense of consumers of other goods sold by same rm (Copulsky,
1976).5 Second, I demonstrate a counterintuitive result; a decrease in the
marginal cost of a high-quality good can reduce rm prot. More precisely,
prot becomes U-shaped in the marginal cost of the high-quality good. Third,
2An example of vertical dierentiation between the iPhone and Android smartphones
is found in Geekbench (see http://browser.primatelabs.com/geekbench2/1030202 and
http://browser.primatelabs.com/android-benchmarks).
3I dene this externality as follows: \A consumer who purchases a product from a
certain rm gains a network benet when other consumers purchase the same product
from the same or dierent rm."(Kitamura, 2013)
4I use a monopoly model to isolate the implication of a within-product network exter-
nality and a multi-product rm, and to stress that the result holds, even in the absence
of strategic interactions among oligopolistic rms. The oligopoly case is left to future
research.
5The relevance of cannibalization has been established empirically. For instance, Ghose
et al. (2006) and Smith and Telang (2008) nd that 16% of used books, 24% of used CDs,
and 86% of used DVDs directly cannibalize new product sales on Amazon.com.
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the relationship between welfare and marginal cost also becomes U-shaped.6
A U-shaped prot with respect to marginal cost implies cost reduction,
for instance, through innovation or an R&D subsidy, can decrease rm prot.
Under the U-shaped prot curve, monopoly prot decreases if the production
cost of the high-quality good is high and the degree of cost reduction is small.
In other words, a suciently signicant cost reduction is required to increase
prot. When the fullled expectation, explored below, is reasonable, a small
R&D subsidy can be detrimental rather than benecial.
Two assumptions play a key role behind these remarkable results. The
rst important assumption is that of a multi-product rm. In this back-
ground market structure, cost reduction leads to cannibalization and the
transition of network within rm aects prot and welfare. The second key
assumption is a fullled expectations equilibrium, where (i) consumers' ex-
pected network sizes are equal to actual (rational expectation), and (ii) \
consumers' expectations of the network sizes are given to all rms" (Katz
and Shapiro, 1985, pp. 427{428).7 This second denition implies that the
rms' announcement of its planned level of output has no eect on consumer
expectations. In this case, the rm cannot commit itself and is unable to
transfer the network sizes optimally in response to the change in marginal
cost. This property of fullled expectation equilibrium is the key rationale
behind the counter intuitive relationship between monopoly prot and falling
6While Lahiri and Ono(1988)nd that under Cournot oligopoly, marginal cost reduc-
tion in a rm with a suciently low share decreases welfare, in this study, under monopoly,
I show the a similar result is caused by two key assumptions: fullled expectations equi-
librium and multi-product rm.
7Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, pp. 134{135) defend the rational expectation hypothesis,
claiming that if consumers' past expectations are not rational, they are still modifying
their expectations.
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cost. The study claries how assumption (ii) works by comparing the fullled
expectation equilibrium where the rm takes the consumers expectation into
consideration, that is, when it commits its own network size/output level.8
This equilibrium concept, proposed by Katz and Shapiro (1985), has been
used in the literature on network industries (e.g., Barrett and Yang, 2001;
Hahn, 2003). Katz and Shapiro (1985) nd no problem regarding rm com-
mitment because their main result holds irrespective of the rm behavior for
consumers' expectation. Most prior studies have not focused on the dier-
ence caused by the rm's commitment. However, my analysis results in a
good model, where the result crucially depends on rms' commitment. This
implies that equilibrium concepts should be chosen carefully and a reconsid-
eration of formalizing the eects of one's action on expected network sizes of
others.
A large body of literature exists on network externalities and multi-
product rms. Katz and Shapiro (1985) are the rst to formulate a duopoly
model with a network externality across both rms' products.9 Baake and
Boom (2001) and Chen and Chen (2011) consider an oligopoly and a duopoly
model of vertical product dierentiation with a network externality, in which
rms decide their degree of product compatibility. However, each rm only
supplies only one and not multiple products. In this study, the degree of
compatibility is exogenous but a single rm produces two types of products.
In contrast, Haruvy and Prasad (1998) analyze a market in which a mo-
nopolist sells high- and low-end versions of the same product and derive the
8Indeed, our U-shaped relation can be obtained if the rm cannot take the consumers'
expectation into consideration. See Remark 2 in Section 3.
9For more extensive surveys, see Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Shy (2001).
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conditions under which producing both goods is optimal with a network ex-
ternality. On the other hand, Desai(2001) considers a two segments duopoly
market for high-quality and low-quality goods represented by a Hotelling
type model without network externality. He examines whether the cannibal-
ization problem aects a rm's price and quality decision. However, in both
their models, the two goods are sold in dierent markets, each with dierent
types of consumers. Instead, I assume that both goods are supplied to the
same market.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 derives the main results. Section 4 contains the comparative statics.
Section 5 concludes, and the Appendix provides proofs of the results.
3.2 The Model
This section presents the model. While I basically follow Katz and Shapiro
(1985), who consider an oligopolistic network industry, I modify their model
in two ways. First, I assume a monopoly to eliminate the strategic eect
between the rms. Second, this single rm produces two vertically dier-
entiated goods which may involve a network externality. In what follows, I
describe the market equilibrium after characterizing the behavior of the rm
and consumers.
I begin by considering the rm's behavior. Suppose a monopolistic rm
producing two goods (H and L) that dier in their quality, and let VH and
VL (VH > VL) denote the quality of each good. For simplicity, I assume that
VH = (1 + )VL, where  > 0 measures the degree of quality dierence, and
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that the quality of good L is normalized to one (i.e., VL = 1). The marginal
cost of producing each good is given by cH and cL, respectively, which satisfy
cH > cL = 0. Then, the rm's prot is dened by
(pH   cH)qH + pLqL; (3.1)
where q and p, for  = H;L, are the output and price of good , respec-
tively. The monopolist chooses outputs to maximize (3.1).
To derive the inverse demand functions, I now describe the behavior of
consumers. Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), consider a continuum of
consumers characterized by a taste parameter  that is uniformly distributed
in [ R; r]; R; r > 0 with density one.10 By purchasing one unit of good ,
consumer  2 [ R; r] obtains a net surplus11
U() = V + Vg
e
   p;  = H;L, (3.2)
where the rst term in the right-hand side is the intrinsic utility of consuming
the good and the second term represents a network externality. Parameter
 > 0 measures the degree of the network externality and ge is the expecta-
tion over the network benet, which takes the form
ge  g(qe) = qe;  = H;L; (3.3)
where, qe is the expectation of output level of good . Therefore, Eq. (3.3)
10I assume that R is large enough to avoid a corner solution.
11Baake and Boom (2001) adopt a similar expression for the consumer surplus.
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represents the within-product externality.
Based on these preparations, I now derive the inverse demand functions.
When consumer ^ is indierent between purchasing good H and good L, it
must hold that
UH

^

= UL

^

> 0
() (1 + )^ + (1 + )geH   pH = ^ + geL   pL:
Thus, the index of this consumer is obtained as
^ =
1

fpH   pL   ((1 + )geH   geL)g: (3.4)
Furthermore, there should be a consumer L who is indierent between
purchasing good L and nothing. The index of such a consumer satises
UL (L) = 0;
and, hence, is obtained as
L = pL   geL: (3.5)
Then, from (3.2), (3.4), and (3.5), and given that UL() is increasing in , I
have
UH(^) = UL(^) > UL(L) = 0;
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which is equivalent to
^ > L: (3.6)
The following lemma follows from this result.12
Lemma 3.1. Any consumer  2 ( R; L) buys nothing, while consumer
 2 ( L; b) ( 2 [b; r]) buys good L (good H ).
From Lemma 3.1, the market-clearing conditions of goods H and L are
r   ^ = qH ; r   L = qH + qL:
Substituting (3.4) and (3.5) into these equations and solving for pH and pL
yields the inverse demand functions:
pH = (1 + )(r + g
e
H   xqH)  qL; pL = r + geL   qH   qL:
Thus, the prot in (3.1) can be rewritten as
f(1 + )(r + geH   qH)  qL   cHgqH + fr + geL   qH   qLgqL: (3.7)
Having described the behavior of the rm and consumers, I now derive the
market equilibrium. For this purpose, I employ Katz and Shapiro's (1985)
concept of the fullled expectations equilibrium, which requires that con-
sumers' expected quantities equal the actual outputs. In addition, the rm
12See the Appendix for the proof.
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chooses the outputs after taking consumers' expectations about the network
size as given. From (3.7), the rst-order conditions for prot maximization
are
 (1 + )qH + (1 + )(r + geH   qH)  qL   qL   cH = 0;
 qH   qL + r + geL   qH   qL = 0:
(3.8)
In addition, to guarantee positive outputs in equilibrium, I make two addi-
tional assumptions:
0 <  <
2(1 +  p1 + )
1 + 
; (3.9)
and
cH < cH < cH ; (3.10)
where cH = (1 + )r=2 and cH = (2     )r=(2  ).
The equilibrium outcomes are obtained from ge = q
e
 = q and (3.8):8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
 (1 + )qH + (1 + )(r + geH   qH)  2qL   cH = 0
 2qH   2qL + r + geL = 0
geH = qH
geL = qL:
Then, the equilibrium outputs and prices are
qH =
(2  )f(1 + )r   cHg   2r
Z
; qL =
 (1 + )r + 2cH
Z
; (3.11)
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and
pH =
r(1+)(2 2 )+f(1+)2 3(1+)+2gcH
Z
; pL =
2r(  )+cH
Z
; (3.12)
where Z = (1 + )(2   )2   4 > 0 by (3.9). These outcomes lead to the
equilibrium prot:
 = 1
Z2
h
f(2  )2 + 2gc2H   2rf2(2  )2 + 22 + (3   4)gcH
+r2(1 + )(2(   2)2 + 42 + ( 8 + 5)
i
: (3.13)
This completes the description of the model.
3.3 U-Shaped Prot
Based on the results in the previous section, this section demonstrates that
the rm prot is U-shaped in the marginal cost of the high-quality good.
The proof of the results are left in Appendix.
3.3.1 Output
First, I consider the eects of an increase in the marginal cost of producing the
high-quality good on each quantity, as described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. An increase (decrease) in cH leads to cannibalization,
such that it reduces (raises) the output of the high-quality good and raises
(reduces) the output of the low-quality good.
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This proposition is a natural result, since the rm would like to produce a
relatively ecient product.13
3.3.2 Prot
Next, I address the eect on the rm prot, which can be stated in
Proposition 3.2. Suppose a within-product network externality exists. Then,
the rm prot is U-shaped in cH .
This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. This result implies that a small cost reduc-
tion can decrease the monopoly prot. When cH is high enough, the rm
does not moderate cost reduction. In other words, the rm does not ac-
cept an innovation or subsidy unless it is able to drastically reduce cH . This
proposition suggests that if cH is suciently high, a decrease in it reduces
the rm's prot.
As emphasized in the Introduction, the assumption that consumers form
their expectations before the output decision is crucial to the above result.14
To see why, let us drop this assumption. That is, I compare this case with the
case in which the rm can control both its output and the expected network
size; it maximizes the prot with taking ge = x into consideration. Then, I
have the following lemma.
13The same property is conrmed in Kitamura and Shinkai (2013), who consider a
duopoly market without a network externality.
14This assumption implies that a monopolist's announcement of its planned level of
output has no eect on consumer expectations.
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Lemma 3.2. In the monopoly model with the fullled expectations equilib-
rium derived above, if cH increases, then marginal changes in the equilibrium
quantities of good H and L are less than when the rm can control the ex-
pected network size.
I have assumed that the rm takes the expected network size as given (i.e.,
it cannot control the expected network size). However, the expected net-
work size must coincide with the actual network size in equilibrium. In other
words, the monopolist choose outputs to maximize the prot without recog-
nizing that the expected network size is equal to the actual network size. This
lack of information leads the rm to either under-produce or over-produce
compared with the case in which the rm can control the expected network
size. To check this result, let us compute the rst-order conditions when the
rm can control the expected network size:
(1 + )(
@gH
@qH
  1)qH + (pH   cH)  qL = 0; ( @gL
@qL
  1)qL + pL   qH = 0:
By contrast, if the rm cannot control the expected network size, the corre-
sponding conditions are
 (1 + )qH + (pH   cH)  qL = 0;   qH + pL   qL = 0:
When the monopolist can control the expected network size, an increase in
output aects the network externality as represented by @g=@q = 1. This
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dierence in the rst-order conditions results in Lemma 3.2. In fact, when
the rm can control the expected network size, the equilibrium outputs are
as follows:
qCH =
(1  )f(1 + )r   cHg   r
2(1 + )(1  )2   2 ; q
C
L =
 (1 + )r + cH
2(1 + )(1  )2   2 ;
where superscript C indicates the case in which the rm can control the
expected network size. Then, I can show that
@qCH@cH
 > @qH@cH
 ; @qCL@cH
 >  @qL@cH
 :
The intuition behind Proposition 3.2 is explained from Proposition 3.1
and Lemma 3.2. According to these, a decrease in cH increases the output
of good H and decreases that of good L. However, these changes are not as
drastic as in the case when the rm can control the expected network size.
Thus, the rm cannot aggressively transfer the network of good L to that of
good H in spite of the decrease in cH , and the positive eect on the prot
from good H is not able to dominate the negative eect of good L. This
nding is impossible, however, if the rm can control the expected network
size.
Indeed, we can observe this fact more plausibly as follows. I consider the
eect of an increase in cH on the prot from producing each individual good:
 = H + 

L  (pH   cH)qH + pLqL. Using this decomposition of prots, I
have the following lemma.15
15Note that the lemma requires the existence of positive equilibrium outputs: (3.9) and
(3.10).
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Lemma 3.3. H is monotonically decreasing in cH , and 

L is monotonically
increasing in cH .
Figure 3.2 illustrates this lemma. Given this lemma and Figure 3.2, when cH
decreases by a suciently large amount, the negative eect on L (i.e.,
@L
@cH
)
dominates the positive eect on H (i.e.,
@H
@cH
). Accordingly, if cH is initially
high, a decrease in cH reduces the overall prot. The opposite holds when
cH is low enough.
Remark 1. One natural question regarding to Proposition 3.2 is whether
the prot continues to be U-shaped in cH even if the two goods have some
compatibility. To answer it, I modify the form of network externality (3.3)
as follows:
ge  g(qeH ; qeL; ) = qe + qe ;  = H;L;  6= ; 0 <   1;
where  is a parameter that measures the degree of compatibility between
the two goods. The following proposition gives an armative answer to the
above question.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that a within-product network externality
and partial compatibility ( < 1) exist between the two dierentiated goods.
Then, the rm's prot is U-shaped in cH .
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This proposition implies that the rm's prot can decrease when cH de-
creases except for the case of  = 1 as long as a within-product network
externality exists.
If  = 1, then ge = q
e
H + q
e
L ( = H;L). Because the two goods are fully
compatible, this case corresponds to the case analyzed by Katz and Shapiro
(1985), that is there is the within-rm network externality. Then, we nd
that the rm's prot is a monotonically decreasing function of cH . However,
the case of fully compatible goods is a special situation,16 because I consider
the within-product network externality, and fully compatible products do
not have individual networks. This result implies that the within-product
network externality oers dierent equilibrium outcomes and properties to
the within-rm network externality established in Katz and Shapiro (1985).
Remark 2. Thus far, I have assumed that a monopolist's announcement
of its planned level of output has no eect on consumer expectations. Then,
another natural question is whether the prot continues to be U-shaped in
cH even when its announcement of output level partially aects consumer
expectations. In order to address it, I modify the form of network externaity
(3.3) as follows:
ge  g(qe; q; ) = q + (1  )qe  = H;L; 0    1:
In this formulation, the monopolist's announcement of its output level has
q inuence on consumer expectations. For instance, if  = 0 then it has no
eect on consumer expectations, on the other hand, if  = 1 then the rm
16See the Appendix for a special case, that is, @

@cH
jcH=cH = 0 only if  = 1.
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perfectly control the consumer expectations. With this generalization, I can
obtain:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that a within-network externality exists be-
tween the two dierentiated goods and the monopolist's announcement of its
planned level of output partially aects ( < 1) consumer expectations. Then,
the rm's prot is U-shaped in cH .
Thus, the rm's prot is U-shaped in so far as its announcement of out-
puts imperfectly (that is when 0   < 1) eects on consumer expectations.
When  = 1, ge = q( = H;L). As mentioned in Lemma 3.2, this
implies that the monopolist can perfectly control the expected network size.
Then, it chooses the output levels to maximize the prot with understanding
that the consumer expectations are equal to the actual network size. Thus in
the same way as reasons of Proposition 3.2, the rm's prot is monotonically
decreasing in cH only when  = 1.
3.4 Further Discussion
In this section, I address two issues that are important but have not been
discussed in the last section.
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3.4.1 Welfare
First, I examine the welfare eect of a change in cH . Noting that welfare is
equal to the sum of the consumer surplus and the rm's prot, it is dened
by
W  
Z ^
L
( + gL)d +
Z r
^
(1 + )( + gH)d   cHqH
=
(1 + )r2
2
+ (1 + )(r   ^)gH + (^   L)gL  
(L)
2
2
  (^
)2
2
  cHqH
=
(1 + )r2
2
+ (1 + )xHg

H + x

Lg

L  
(r   xH   xL)2
2
  (r   x

H)
2
2
  cHqH ;
where superscript  indicates the equilibrium outcome. Lengthy manipu-
lations allow me to have a notable relationship W  = 3=2. Hence, the
following result is immediately obtained.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that a within-product network externality exists.
Then, social welfare is U-shaped in cH .
This proposition is natural since the consumer surplus is larger when cH
takes an extremely large or small value and only one side of the network
is larger than it is when cH takes an intermediate value and each network
size is small.17 Recalling Remark 1 and discussion after Proposition 3.3, I
immediately nd that welfare with fully compatible products ( = 1) is a
monotonically decreasing function of cH because, in that case, the network
size of each product is always the sum of the network sizes of both products.
17The consumer surplus is also U-shaped in cH .
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Proposition 3.2 and 3.5 imply that a drastic cost reduction is needed to
increase the prot and welfare when the production cost of the high-quality
good is high. Then, as a mentioned in Section 1, these suggest that if the
production subsidy is insucient, subsization can reduce both the rm's
prot and welfare.
3.4.2 Eect of  on Outputs
Throughout this paper, I have focused on the eect of cH . Finally, I consider
the eect of an increase in the quality of the high-quality good  on each
quantity, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6. An increase in  leads to an increase (decrease) in xH(x

L).
This proposition is also interesting because cannibalization occurs as a
result of not only cH but also .
18 That is, an increase in  has a contrast-
ing eect in the sense that it raises (reduces) qH(qL). The intuition for this
proposition is as follows. A larger dierence in the quality of the two goods
implies that the high-quality good is superior to the low-quality good, which
has a positive eect on the utility of the consumer. Thus, when the quality
dierence of the two goods becomes large , the monopolist has an incen-
tive to increase qH . In such a case, cannibalization occurs as it raises qH
while qL decreases. Conversely, when the dierence in the quality of the two
goods decreases, the consumer does not value the high-quality good over the
18In Proposition 4.1, the change in the parameter of supply side cH causes cannibaliza-
tion, while in Proposition 4.6, that of demand side  leads to cannibalization.
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low-quality good. Thus, the monopolist will expand qL since it is costly to
produce qH . In this case, cannibalization occurs such that the rm produces
more of good L and less of good H. For example, the iPad Mini cannibalized
sales of the larger iPad.19
3.4.3 Symmetric Cournot Oligopoly
Finally, I modify previous model from monopolistic market to the oligopolis-
tic one. Suppose, there are n rms (i = 1; 2; :::n), each rm producing two
goods (H and L) that dier in their quality but having same production tech-
nology (cH > cL = 0), and let VH and VL (VH > VL) denote the quality of
each good. Then, the rm's prot i is dened by
i  (piH   cH)xiH + piLxiL; (3.14)
where xi and pi, for  = H;L, are the output and price of rm i's good ,
respectively. The oligopolistic rm i chooses outputs to maximize (3.14). By
purchasing one unit of good , consumer  2 [ R; r] obtains a net surplus
Ui() = V + Vg
e
i   pi:  = H;L, (3.15)
The expectation over the network benet takes the form
gei  gi(xei) = Xe;  = H;L: (3.16)
19See the internet articles by Keizer (2012) and Seward (2013).
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Where, Xe = nx
e
i and x
e
i is the expectation of output level of good .
Therefore, Eq. (3.16) represents the within-product externality.
Based on these preparations, I have the inverse demand functions;
piH = (1 + )(r + g
e
iH  XH) XL; piL = r + geiL  XH  XL:
Then, the rst-order conditions for prot maximization are
 (1 + )xiH + (1 + )(r + geiH  XH) XL   xiL   cH = 0;
 xiH   xiL + r + geiL  XH  XL = 0:
(3.17)
In addition, to guarantee the positive outputs and the stability condition of
Cournot-Nash equilibria , I make two additional assumptions:
0 <  <
(1 + n)(1 +  p1 + )
(1 + )n
; (3.18)
and
cH < cH < cH ; (3.19)
where cH = (1+)nr=(n+1) and cH = (n+ n n)r=(1+n n).
Here, I have assumed symmetric rm and focus on symmetric equilibrium
outcome, so that xiH = x

H for all rm in equilibrium. The equilibrium
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outputs are obtained from gei = X
e
 = X and (3.17):8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
 (1 + )xH + (1 + )(r + geiH  XH) XL   xL   cH = 0
 xH   xL + r + geiL  XH  XL = 0
geiH = XH
geiL = XL:
Then, the equilibrium outputs are
xH =
(n+ 1  n)f(1 + )r   cHg   (n+ 1)r
Z
; xL =
 (1 + )nr + (n+ 1)cH
Z
:
(3.20)
Thus, the prices and the prot in equilibrium (pH(x

H ; x

L); p

L(x

H ; x

L); 
(xH ; x

L))
are also obtained from (3.20). Based on the results in these, this demonstrates
that the rm prot is U-shaped in the marginal cost of the high-quality good.
The proof of the results are left in Appendix. I address the eect on the rm
prot, which can be stated in
Proposition 3.7. Suppose a within-product network externality exists and
there are n rms. Then, the rm prot can be U-shaped in cH .
This result implies that a small cost reduction can decrease the each prot.
As mentioned in Appendix, the U-shaped prot in cH requires that 1 (1 )n
is positive. That is, this holds if the number of rm n is suciently small and
the value of network externality  is too large. Further, note that 1 (1 )n
is necessarily positive when n = 1, that is, monopoly case in Proposition 3.3.
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This proposition suggests that if cH is suciently high, a decrease in it re-
duces the rm's prot. Although the background process of this result is
same way in Proposition 3.3, it is not easy to be U-shaped prot in cH since
the existence of competition weakens an irrelevant transition of network sizes
by each rm.
Next, I modify the form of network externality (3.16) as follows:
gei  gi(xei) = xei + xe i  = H;L;  6= ; 0 <   1;
where  is a parameter that measures the degree of compatibility among the
same goods. The following proposition is intuitive results.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose that a within-product network externality
and partial compatibility ( < 1) exist among the same goods produced by
dierent rm. Then, the higher compatibility leads the rm's prot to be U-
shaped in cH .
Similarly to Proposition 4.7, the suciently condition for U-shaped prot
in cH is that 1 n++(1 n) > 0. That is, the large degree of compatibility
among the same goods  leads to U-shaped prot in cH
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
Highlighting a within-product network externality, this chapter has theoret-
ically analyzed multi-product monopoly behavior and the resulting market
congurations. In particular, I focused on a monopoly model where a sin-
gle rm sells two dierentiated products ( low- and high-quality goods) in a
market with a within-goods network externality.
The notable result is that the rm prot is U-shaped in the production
cost of the high-quality good. This result implies that the rm prot may de-
crease in spite of a cost reduction. Then, I have shown that two assumptions,
the fullled expectations equilibrium and multi-product monopoly, yield the
counterintuitive result. Moreover, I addressed the two cases in which (i) the
two goods are partially and fully compatible and (ii) a rm's announcement
of its output partially and perfectly aects consumer expectations, and es-
tablished that when a within-product network externality exists, the rm
prot is U-shaped except for two polar cases in which the two goods are
completely compatible and in which a rm's announcement perfectly inu-
ences on consumer expectations. This analysis also shows that it is easy to
be U-shaped prot in production cost when both the there exist a few rms
in the market and the value of a within-product network externality is too
high. In addition, I analyzed the eect of a change in the production cost
of the high-quality good on welfare, nding that welfare is also U-shaped in
the cost.
Furthermore, I highlighted that changes in the production cost and in
the quality of the high-quality good aect the quantities. Moreover, by using
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the example of cannibalization, I found that an increase (decrease) in the
production cost of the high-quality good and a decrease (increase) in its
quality bring about cannibalization, such that the rm raises (reduces) the
output of the high-quality good while it reduces (raises) the output of the
low-quality good.
In this chapter, I exclusively focused on a monopoly model without choos-
ing product compatibility, but future studies should aim to analyze a model
when the rm can choose a compatible product with a xed cost of making
its products compatible.
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Figure 3.1 (r = 1;  = 1=2;  = 1)
Figure 3.2 (r = 1;  = 1=2;  = 1)
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1
According to Eqs. (4.2) and (4.4), for arbitrary  > ^i, from (4.2) and (3.6),
we have
UL(b)  UL(L) = ^ + geL   pL   (L + geL   pL)
= ^   L > 0;
for arbitrary type  2 ( L; b): Then,
UH()  UL() = (1 + ) + (1 + )geH   pH      geL + pL
=    fpH   pL   ((1 + )geH   geL)g
> ^   fpH   pL   ((1 + )geH   geL)g
= 0:
From (4.2) and (3.6), we have
UL(b)  UL(L) = ^ + geL   pL   (L + geL   pL)
= ^   L > 0;
for arbitrary type  2 ( L; b):
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Proof of Proposition 3.1
From equilibrium outcome (3.11), we have @qH=@cH < 0 and @q

L=@cH > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.28>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@2
@c2H
= 2f(2 )
2+2g
Z2
> 0
@
@cH
jcH=cH =  rf(2 ) g(2 )Z < 0; @

@cH
jcH=cH = 2r(2 )Z > 0:
Proof of Lemma 3.3
The individual prots from producing goods H and L are given by
H =
fcH(2 )+rf( 2+)+ggfcHf(2 ) g+r(1+)f( 2+)+2gg
Z2
L =
f 2cH+r(1+)gf cH+2rf( 1+)+gg
Z2
;
respectively, so that
8>><>>:
@H
@cH
jcH=cH =  rZ < 0;
@2H
@c2H
= 2(2 )(2  )
Z2
> 0
@L
@cH
jcH=cH = rZ > 0;
@2L
@c2H
= 4
Z
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.3
The equilibrium outcomes for 0 <   1 are obtained as follows.
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8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
qH =
(2 )fr(1+) cHg rf2 (1+)g
Z
; qL =
(1+)(2 ) fr(1+) cHg(2 )
Z
pH =
r(1+)(2( 1)+f2 (1 )g+cHf(1 )( 3++) f 2+(3 2) (1 2)2gg
Z
pL =
2rf( 1)+f1+ 1)gg+(1 )cHg
Z
 = 1
Z2
h
f(2  )2 + (1  )22gc2H + 2rf 2(1  )22 + 2( 2 + )f2  (1  )g+ (1  )f4 + (2  3)ggcH
+r2(1 + )f4(1  )22 + 2f2  (1  )g2   (1  )f8  5(1  )gg
i
;
where Z = (1   )( +    4) + f4   2(2   ) + (1   2)2g > 0.
Furthermore, cH < cH < cH where cH = (1 + )(1   )r=(2   ) and
cH = frf(1 + )(2  )  f2  (1 + )gg=(2  ).
Then, 8>><>>:
@
@cH
jcH=cH =  rf(2 ) (1 )g(2 )Z < 0
@
@cH
jcH=cH = 2(1 )r(2 )Z  0:
Thus, the rm prot is U-shaped in cH except for the case of  = 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4
The equilibrium outcomes for 0    1 are given as follows:
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
qH =
(2  )f(1+)r cHg 2r
Z
; qL =
2cH (1+)(1+)r
Z
pH =
cHf 3+( 1+)+2+( 1+)( 2++)g+r(1+)f(1+)( 2+)+f2 (1+3)+(1+)2gg
Z
pL =
 cH( 1+)+rf(1+)( 2+)+f2 2(1+)+(1+)2gg
Z
 = 1
Z2
h
f( 1 + )( 2 +  + )2 + f + 2(5  2)   32   (8  6 + 2)ggc2H
+2rf(1 + )22( 2 + ) + 2( 1 + )( 2 +  + )2 + f4  3 + 232 + 2( 7 + 4) + 2(4  5 + 2)ggcH
+r2(1 + )f( 1  )f(1 + )( 2 + ) + f2  2(1 + ) + (1 + )2gg
 f(1 + ) + ( 2 +  + )gf(1 + )( 2 + ) + f2  (1 + 3) + (1 + )2ggg
i
;
where Z = (1 + )(2      )2   4 > 0 if and only if 0 <  < 2(1 +
   p1 + )=(1 + )(1 + ). Furthermore, cH < cH < cH where cH =
(1 + )(1 + )r=2 and cH = rf2  (1 + )(1 + )g=(2     ).
Then,
8>><>>:
@
@cH
jcH=cH =  rff 1+( 3)+
2g+f2 (1+3)+(1+)2g
Z
< 0
@
@cH
jcH=cH = 2(1 )r(2  )Z  0:
Thus, the rm prot is U-shaped in cH except for the case of  = 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5
Straightforward manipulations give
@qH
@
=
(2  )f(2  )2cH   2rg
Z2
> 0;
@qL
@
=
 2f(2  )2cH   2rg
Z2
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.78>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@2
@c2H
= 2(1+n n)
2+2n
Z2
> 0
@
@cH
jcH=cH = (1+n)f1 (1 )ng(2 )Z :
Thus, if both n is suciently small and  is suciently large, then the prot
becomes U-shaped in cH .
Proof of Proposition 3.8
The equilibrium outcomes for 0 <   1 are obtained as follows.
8>><>>:
xH =
f1+n (1+(n 1))gf1+)r cHg (1+n)r
Z
xL =
 r(1+)f1+(n 1)+(1+n)cH
Z
where Z = (1 + )f1 + n  (1 + (n  1))g2   (1 + n)2 > 0. Furthermore,
cH < cH < cH where cH = r(1 + )f1 + (n   1)=(1 + n) and cH =
frf(1 + )f1 + n  (1 + (n  1))g   (1 + n)g=f1 + n  (1 + (n  1))g.
Then, 8>><>>:
@2
@c2H
= 2f1+n (1+(n 1))g
2+2f1+(n 1)
Z2
> 0
@
@cH
jcH=cH = (1+n)f1 n+(1+(n 1))gZ :
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Thus, the rm prot is U-shaped in cH when  is too large and n is suciently
small.
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Chapter 4
A Monopoly Model with Two
Horizontally Dierentiated
Goods under Network
Externalities
94
abstract1
This chapter develops a linear model in which a monopolist supplies two hor-
izontally dierentiated goods involving a within-product network externality.
Within this model, I analyze multi-product monopoly behavior. Then, I ex-
amine how a change in both the production cost and the location cost gives
eect on equilibrium location, outputs, prices and prot. Furthermore, I nd
how a change in a degree of compatibility between two goods aects them.
Keywords : Multi-product rm, Monopoly, Cannibalization, Network ex-
ternality
1I thank Kenji Fujiwara, Hiroaki Ino, Noriaki Matsushima and Tetsuya Shinkai as well
as the other participants at the workshop at Kwansei Gakuin University for their useful
comments. Any remaining errors are my own.
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4.1 Introduction
Within-product network externality works in many industries in which the
products are horizontally dierentiated.2 Mentioned in previous, for in-
stance, a refrigerator, a television, PC industry and so on. In these industry,
when the number of users who buy a certain products increases, then a user
of it gains a network benet because of an increase in complementary goods
(some software, compatible goods) of it or an improvement of some services.
In order to theoretically consider these industry, I incorporate within-
product network externality into the multi-product monopoly model based on
Bental and Spiegel (1984) that analyze the oligopolistic multi-product market
with horizontally dierentiated products. Then, I nd that the cost reduction
of both the production cost and the location cost increases the monopoly
rm's location, outputs, prices and prot. Furthermore, an increase in the
value of network size also gives same eects on them. Finally, I consider the
eect of degree of the compatibility between two products on equilibrium
location, outputs prices and prot. Then, I show that an increase in degree
of compatibility gives positive eect on them.
A lot of the existing literatures on the problem \horizontal product va-
riety" consider consumers, who do not agree on their ranking of varieties.
Lancaster (1979) and Salop (1979) among others, also incorporate this no-
tion.3 I expand the multi-product monopoly model by Bental and Spiegel
(1984), where they assume that, `a rm's technology is geared towards the
2For denition of within-product network externality, see Kitamura(2014)
3Mussa and Rosen (1978) consider the problem \vertical product variety".
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production of a particular brand which they call the \main product". The
rm may also produce varieties of the main product, so that the design of
these varieties is associated with(x) cost.'
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I
present a model and derive a monopoly equilibrium with two horizontally
dierentiated products in a market and with within-products network exter-
nality. In section 1.3, I use comparative statistics of the equilibrium location,
outputs, prices and prot. Finally, section 1.4 concludes the paper and oers
suggestions for possible future research.
4.2 Model
This section presents the model and derives the equilibria. Following the
formulation of Bental and Spiegel (1984), I modify their model in two ways.
First, I assume a monopoly which sells two horizontally dierentiated prod-
ucts, 1 and 2. Second, these products potentially involve a network external-
ity. I begin by considering the rm's behavior. Suppose a monopolistic rm
producing two goods (1 and 2) that dier in their locations, and let l1 and l2
denote the location of each good. For simplicity, I assume that l1 = 0 < l2.
The marginal cost of producing each good is given by c1 and c2, respectively,
which satisfy c1 = c2 = c. Moreover, the rm suers the cost from locating
good 2 as fl22=2; f > 0; which is increasing as the variety gets technology
further from the 'main product' good 1. Then, the rm's prot is dened by
(p1   c)q1 + (p2   c)q2   f l
2
2
2
; (4.1)
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where q and p, for  = 1; 2, are the output and price of good , respectively.
The monopolist chooses location and outputs to maximize (4.1).
To derive the inverse demand functions, I now describe the behavior of
consumers. Following Bental and Spiegel (1984), consider a continuum of
consumers characterized by a taste parameter  that is uniformly distributed
in [0; r]; r > 0 with density one.4 By purchasing one unit of good , consumer
 2 [0; r] obtains a net surplus
U() = R + g
e
   j   lj   p; R > 0;  = 1; 2, (4.2)
where the rst term in the right-hand side is the intrinsic utility of consuming
the good and the second term represents a network externality. Parameter
 > 0 measures the degree of the network externality and ge is the expecta-
tion over the network benet, which takes the form
ge  g(qe) = qe;  = 1; 2: (4.3)
Where, qe is the expectation of output level of good . Therefore, Eq. (4.3)
represents the within-product externality.
Based on these preparations, I now derive the inverse demand functions.
When consumer ^ is indierent between purchasing good 1 and good 2, it
must hold that
U1

^

= U2

^

> 0
() R + ge1   ^   p1 = R + ge2   (l2   ^)  p2:
4I assume that r is large enough to avoid a corner solution.
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Thus, the index of this consumer is obtained as
^ =
1
2
fl2 + p2   p1 + (ge1   ge2)g: (4.4)
Furthermore, there should be a consumer  who is indierent between pur-
chasing good 2 and nothing. The index of such a consumer satises
U2
 


= 0;
and, hence, is obtained as
 = R + ge2 + l2   p2: (4.5)
Thus, the market-clearing conditions of goods H and L are
^ = q1;    ^ = q2:
This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Substituting (4.4) and (4.5) into these equations and solving for p1 and
p2 yields the inverse demand functions:
p1 = R + 2l2 + g
e
1   3q1   q2; p2 = R + l2 + ge2   q1   q2:
Thus, the prot in (4.1) can be rewritten as
fR+2l2+ ge1  3q1  q2  cgq1+ fR+ l2+ ge2  q1  q2  cgq2  f
l22
2
: (4.6)
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4.3 Analysis
Having described the behavior of the rm and consumers, I now derive the
market equilibrium. For this purpose, I employ Katz and Shapiro's (1985)
concept of the fullled expectations equilibrium, which requires that con-
sumers' expected quantities equal the actual outputs. In addition, the rm
chooses the outputs and the location after taking consumers' expectations
about the network size as given. From (4.6), the rst-order conditions for
prot maximization on q1; q2; l2 are
R + 2l2 + g
e
1   6q1   2q2   c = 0;
R + l2 + g
e
2   2q1   2q2   c = 0;
2q1 + q2   fl2 = 0:
(4.7)
In addition, to guarantee positive outputs in equilibrium, I make an addi-
tional assumption:
0 <  < 1; (4.8)
0 < c < R; (4.9)
5  3
2(2  ) < f <
1

: (4.10)
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The equilibrium outcomes are obtained from ge = q
e
 = q and (4.7):8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
R + 2l2 + g
e
1   6q1   2q2   c = 0
R + l2 + g
e
2   2q1   2q2   c = 0
2q1 + q2   fl2 = 0
ge1 = q1
ge2 = q2:
(4.11)
Then, the equilibrium location, outputs and prices are
l2 =
(4  3)(R  c)
Z
q1 =
(1  f)(R  c)
Z
; q2 =
(4f   f   2)(R  c)
Z
;
p1 =
f1+4f(1 )gR+cf5 7+f(2 )2g
Z
; p2 =
f 1+2(2 )gR+cf 5(1 )+f(2 6+4)g
Z
;
where Z = f2   (8f   5) + 8f   6 > 0 by (4.10). These outcomes lead to
the equilibrium prot:
 =
f4f 2(32   8 + 8)  f(92   24 + 32) + 6g(R  c)2
2Z2
This completes the description of the model.5 Then,
q1   q2 =
(R  c)(3  4f)
Z
< 0
5In this setting, it is easy to conrm that the monopoly prot from suppling two
products is higher than that from suppling only one product (good 1 or good 2 ).
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and
p1   p2 =
2ff(2(1  )r + c)  (1  )R  cg
Z
> 0
, where note that f > 5  32(2  ) > f(1  )R  cg=f2(1  )r + cg by
 > 0 and (4.10).
Proposition 4.1 The monopolist produces good 2 more than good 1 and
sets the high-price on good 1 and low-price on good 2.
This proposition is natural since it is easy for rm to take the demand of
good 2 than the demand of good 1. Because the demand of good 1 depends
on ^, it is always faced with cannibalization of the two goods. However the
demand of good 2 is sum of the consumers  2 [^; l2] and  2 [l2; ]. The
latter demand is not aected by cannibalization of two goods contrary to the
former demand, so that the rm can easily capture the demand of good 2
than the demand of good 1.
Here, I consider the eect of a change in location cost of producing the
good 2 and on location, each quantity, each price and prot.
The results of comparative statics illustrated in following table.6
Table 1
l2 x

1 x

2 p

1 p

2 

f            
Proposition 4.2 A decrease in f leads to an increase in l2, q

1, q

2, p

1,
p2 and 
.
6See Appendix for these calculations.
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This implies that the cost reduction of good 2's location gives positive
eects on the monopoly rm's location, outputs, prices and prot. In Chapter
3, I show that a decrease in the marginal cost of high-quality good leads to
cannibalization such that an increase in the number of users of high-quality
good occurs at the expense of those of low-quality good, so that rm prot
can decreases.7
Remark. Finally, I consider the eect of degree of compatibility between
two goods on equilibrium location, outputs, prices and prot. To analyze it,
I modify the form of network externality (4.3) as follows:
ge  g(qe1; qe2; ) = qe + qe;  = 1; 2: (4.12)
where  is a parameter that measures the degree of compatibility between
two goods. For simplicity, I assume that c = 0 and f = 1. The following
table gives the results of comparative statics:
Table 2
l2 x

1 x

2 p

1 p

2 

 + + + + + +
Proposition 4.3 Suppose that there exists partial compatibility between
two goods. An increase in the degree of compatibility leads to an increase in
l2, q

1, q

2 , p

1, p

2 and 
.
This proposition implies that when compatibility cost is zero, then the
move to completely compatibility raises the rm prot.
7In this paper, I use the concept of cannibalization dened by Copulsky(1976).
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4.4 Concluding Remarks
Highlighting a within-product network externality, this thesis has theoret-
ically analyzed multi-product monopoly behavior and the resulting market
congurations. In this chapter, I focused on a monopoly model where a
single rm sells two horizontally dierentiated products in a market with a
within-goods network externality.
The notable result is that the cost reduction of both the production cost
and the location cost increases the monopoly rm's location, outputs, prices
and prot. Furthermore, an increase in the value of network size also gives
same eects on them. Finally, I address the eect of degree of the compati-
bility between two goods on equilibrium location, outputs prices and prot.
Then, I nd that an increase in degree of compatibility gives positive eect on
them. Therefore, The rm would like to make two products more compatible
if the compatibility cost is small enough.
In this chapter, I exclusively focused on a monopoly model so that, in
future works, it should be analyzed oligopolistic markets at same framework.
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Appendix
Comparative statics without compatibility
The results of each calculation are as follows
@l2
@f
=
 (R  c)(4  3)(2   8 + 8)
Z2
< 0;
@q1
@f
=
 2(R  c)(32   7 + 4)
Z2
< 0;
@q2
@f
=
 (R  c)(32   10 + 8)
Z2
< 0;
@p1
@f
=
 (R  c)(212   52 + 32)
Z2
< 0;
@p2
@f
=
 (R  c)(4  3)2
Z2
< 0;8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@
@f
= (4 3)(R c)
2N
2Z3
@N
@f
=  (32  40 + 122 + 33) > 0
N jf= 1

=  64 + 32

+ 46   122 > 0 if 0 <  < 1:
where N = 24  34 + 152   f(32  40 + 122 + 33).
Equilibrium outcomes with partial compatibility
The equilibrium location, quantities, prices and prot are obtained as
l2 =
R(4  3 + 3)
Z
;
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q1 =
R(1 +)
Z
;
q2 =
R(2 +)
Z
;
p1 =
R(5 4+4)
Z
;
p2 =
R(3 2+2)
Z
;
 =
R2f3(1  )22   8(1  ) + 6g
2Z2
;
where Z = (1  2)2   3 + 2.
Comparative statics with compatibility
(c = 0; f = 1; 0    1):
@l2
@f
=
Rf3(1  )2   (9  8) + 6g
Z2
> 0;
@q1
@f
=
Rf(1  )22   (3  2) + 2g
Z2
> 0;
@q2
@f
=
Rf(1  )22   (3  4) + 2g
Z2
> 0;
@p1
@f
=
2Rf2(1  )22   (6  5) + 4g
Z2
> 0;
@p2
@f
=
2Rf(1  )22   (9  8) + 6g
Z2
> 0;
@
@f
=
R2f 3(1  )33 + (13  25+ 122)2   18(1  ) + 8g
Z3
> 0:
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